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Abstract
Fiscal policies that stabilize debt may not provide the fiscal backing necessary for
monetary policy to successfully target inflation. Appropriate backing is provided by
passive fiscal behavior. Understanding the distinction between stabilizing and passive
fiscal policies is central to the design of fiscal rules.
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1 Introduction
Fiscal frameworks and associated fiscal rules are being designed with two objectives in mind:
ensuring fiscal sustainability and providing some degree of countercyclical policy. The think-
ing behind this design is that with fiscal sustainability ensured, an independent central bank
can pursue inflation targeting without fear that fiscal considerations will undermine its efforts
to control inflation. Portes and Wren-Lewis (2014) thoughtfully discuss the considerations
that underlie the fiscal rules countries are adopting.
This institutional design aims to insulate the central bank from the kinds of fiscal pres-
sures that advanced economies have not experienced since the hyperinflations in Austria,
Germany, Hungary, and Poland after World War I. Confronted with debts denominated in
units of goods—gold or foreign currency—those countries resorted to printing fiat currency
to generate real revenues—seigniorage [Sargent (1986)]. Memories of the spectacular failure
of those policies continue to condition how macroeconomists frame monetary-fiscal policy
interactions and continue to guide macroeconomic policy design.
Governments today, particularly in advanced economies but also in many emerging
economies, do not primarily issue debt denominated in units of goods. Instead, the vast
majority of government debt is nominal: government bonds are predominantly promises
of payments in domestic currency—units of fiat money. The presence of nominal govern-
ment debt introduces fresh channels for fiscal inflation that carry broad implications for
monetary-fiscal interactions, implications that fundamentally alter the nature of price-level
determination.
Designers of fiscal rules believe that by ensuring fiscal sustainability, the rules will per-
mit monetary policy to achieve its flexible inflation targeting objectives. This perspective
misapprehends the nature of price level determination. Fiscal sustainability may or may
not be consistent with passive fiscal behavior.1 It is passive fiscal behavior that provides
the fiscal backing necessary for the central bank to control inflation. For example, a con-
tractionary open-market sale of government bonds raises nominal interest rates, including
yields on government bonds. If the higher debt service is permitted to flow into more rapid
growth in nominal debt with no prospect of eventually higher taxes—or primary surpluses,
more generally—then bond holders will perceive that their wealth has increased and seek to
convert that wealth into purchases of goods. This higher aggregate demand will ultimately
raise the price level.2 For the monetary contraction to reduce inflation, higher debt service
must portend higher taxes that eliminate the wealth effect from the monetary action.
Remarkably, the distinction between stabilizing and passive fiscal policy behavior does
not appear in the monetary-fiscal policy interactions literature.
This note draws on Patinkin’s (1974, p. 16) observation that analyses that followed from
Keynes (1936) tend to concentrate on “...the substitution effects, to the exclusion of the
possible wealth—or real-balance—effect.” This observation is equally true of the class of
1Leeper (1991) defines “active” and “passive” policy behavior. Essentially, an active policy authority is
free to pursue its objective, whatever it might be, while a passive authority is constrained by private behavior
and the behavior of the active authority to support the active authority’s actions.
2Sims (2011) calls this “stepping on a rake:” a higher nominal interest rate initially reduces inflation,
but raises inflation once the wealth effect dominates. Cochrane (2016) explores the mechanism in detail.
Wallace (1981) recognized the centrality of fiscal backing for monetary policy impacts.
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new Keynesian models now in wide use by central banks and academics to study monetary
policy [for example, Woodford (2003)]. This note uses a simplified version of those models to
illustrate that conventional effects of exogenous monetary policy actions require fiscal policy
to neutralize monetary policy’s wealth effects. That is, conventional monetary effects in
dynamic models require passive fiscal behavior. Fiscal policy must not only be sustainable,
it must also provide the right kind of fiscal backing for monetary policy to operate as the
inflation targeting framework intends.
2 A Simple Model
Consider an infinitely-lived representative consumer who receives a constant endowment
of goods each period in the amount y and derives utility only from consumption. The
equilibrium real interest rate is constant at r = (1/β)− 1 where 0 < β < 1 is the consumer’s








where Rt is both the gross one-period nominal interest rate on nominal bonds bought at t
and pay off in t+1 and the monetary policy instrument, and pit+1 is the gross rate of inflation
between t and t+ 1. To derive (1) we imposed equilibrium in the goods market, ct = y − g,
which assumes the government purchases a constant quantity of goods each period.















where pi∗ is the inflation target and R∗ = pi∗/β is the nominal interest rate consistent with
the inflation target. We assume α ≥ 0. Monetary policy is active when α > β and passive
otherwise.
Fiscal policy levies lump-sum taxes of τt and sets purchases to be constant, g > 0.
Government issues one-period nominal bonds, Bt, that satisfy the flow constraint
Bt
Pt




where Pt is the aggregate price level.
A commonly-used fiscal rule can illustrate the distinction between stabilizing and passive
fiscal behavior. Posit that tax deviations from steady state are proportional to deviations of









where τt is tax revenues, Bt−1 is nominal debt outstanding at the beginning of t, Pt−1 is
the price level in period t − 1, and τ ∗ and b∗ are steady state levels of revenues and real
government debt. Assume that γ ≥ 0.
3This is a simplified form of Taylor’s (1993) rule for monetary policy.
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3 Stabilizing and Passive Fiscal Behavior
Combining (4) with (3) and defining real debt as bt ≡ Bt/Pt yields
bt + (τ





Taking expectations conditional on information at t − 1, imposing the Fisher relation, (1),




















βT−tEtbT = 0 (7)
Evidently, the fiscal parameter γ figures prominently in ensuring this condition is satisfied.
In fact, satisfaction of the transversality condition is how Bohn (1998) defines “sustainable”
fiscal policy. It is clear from inspection of the debt evolution, (6), that γ > 0 ensures that
the real value of debt is expected to grow at a rate less than 1/β so that (7) is satisfied.
With the tax rule in (4), when γ > r = β−1 − 1, this tax rule accomplishes two things.
First, when taxes are proportional to debt by a constant that exceeds the real interest rate,
the revenue increase is sufficient both to cover the additional real debt service from higher
debt and to retire some of the newly issued debt each period. That response ensures that
debt is stable, eventually returning to steady state. Importantly, this first accomplishment
entails stabilizing real government debt.
The second thing the tax rule in (4) accomplishes involves the response of taxes to
changes in the price level, Pt−1. The contractionary monetary policy example illustrates
that for monetary policy to control inflation, fiscal policy must neutralize the wealth effects
that monetary actions produce. When γ > 0, tax rule (4) makes future taxes move inversely
with the price level, so when a monetary contraction reduces inflation, the rule produces a
higher path for tax revenues. To word this differently, passive fiscal policy delivers the fiscal
backing necessary for monetary actions to affect inflation in the usual ways. That backing
must take the form that fiscal contraction supports monetary contractions that reduce the
price level. If those higher future taxes are not forthcoming, the monetary contraction must
eventually raise the price level.
4 Stabilizing vs. Passive Fiscal Behavior
This discussion suggests that debt stabilization and passive fiscal behavior need not coincide,
although setting γ > r in (4) happens to deliver both outcomes. It is easy to construct
examples of policies that stabilize debt, but do not provide the fiscal backing that passive
policy delivers. And a policy may be passive but fail to stabilize debt. Both examples can
come from the class of rules that (4) describes.
4 The derivation uses the fact that in steady state τ∗ − g = (β−1 − γ)b∗.
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4.1 Stabilizing 6=⇒ Passive
The clearest example of stabilizing, but non-passive fiscal policy sets the primary surplus at
a positive constant each period, s > 0. This is an example of both a sustainable fiscal policy
and an active fiscal policy that delivers a unique equilibrium price level. Set γ = 0 so that
τt = τ
∗ for all t and s = τ ∗ − g.
After taking expectations and imposing the Fisher relation, the government’s flow budget
identity reduces to
bt−1 = βEt−1(bt + s)
which implies that





In this Fisherian model, a constant primary surplus implies that the real value of government







With Rt−1 and Bt−1 predetermined at t, (9) delivers a unique equilibrium positive price level
so long as s > 0.
In this example, fiscal policy is clearly sustainable: real government debt is constant, so
discounted debt converges to zero. But because taxes are unresponsive to the price level,
fiscal policy does not provide the backing that monetary policy requires to affect inflation in
the usual ways. As (9) makes clear, if monetary policy increases the nominal interest rate
at t, debt service rises at t+ 1, (Rt − 1)Bt. The household’s higher interest receipts are not
met with higher tax obligations, so the interest receipts raise nominal wealth. Converting
that wealth into a higher path for consumption goods raises demand and the price level in
t+ 1.
If monetary policy were to pursue an inflation target by setting α > β, the monetary
policy rule, (2), together with the Fisher relation, (1), imply that the bounded solution for
inflation is pit = pi
∗ for all t, without any reference to fiscal behavior or the government’s
budget identity. Evidently, this solution for the price level, Pt = pi
∗Pt−1, will generally conflict
with the solution in (9) because the fiscal policy of a constant surplus, while sustainable,
does not provide the necessary support for the central bank to successfully target inflation.
To see this in more detail, notice that when s > 0, (8) and (9) imply that 1/pit =


























If α < β, this converges over time to 1/Rt = β/pi
∗. But when the Taylor principle is
satisfied, α > β in this model, Rt and, therefore, pit diverge over time unless the economy
4
Stabilization vs. Passivity
starts in its steady state and is never perturbed. More precisely, if α > β, then (10) implies
that the nominal interest rate and inflation either grow or shrink exponentially. In one
direction lies hyperinflation; in the other direction the nominal interest rate eventually falls
below any plausible lower bound. This is a version of the well-known result that if the
primary surplus is constant, then a monetary policy that follows the Taylor principle will
produce explosive inflation.5
4.2 Passive 6=⇒ Stabilizing
Although of less practical interest in light of the fiscal rules countries are adopting, it is also
possible for fiscal behavior to be passive, but not produce a stable process for real government
debt.
If r > γ > 0, then as Bohn (1998) and Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2001) show, fiscal
policy is “sustainable” in the sense that the equilibrium debt process satisfies private agents’
transversality conditions. But in this a rather special equilibrium, debt is not stable: the
debt-output ratio grows without bound; the equilibrium requires access to tax revenues that
can also grow without bound at the same rate that debt grows.6
How can it be feasible for the debt-output ratio to grow without bound? The equilibrium
hangs together only if there is no limit to the tax revenue that can be raised. Then, when
interest payments on the debt grow at rate r, bond holders’ income also grows at rate r.
A government that has access to non-distorting taxes simply extracts that growing interest
income to finance the growing debt stock.7 Of course, if the economy faces a fiscal limit—
because economic or political considerations constrain tax collection—then government debt
cannot grow faster than the economy forever. Those considerations call for setting γ > r, as
much of the literature assumes, and passive fiscal behavior also stabilizes debt.
5 Fiscal Rules
A reading of fiscal rules that countries have adopted raises concerns about whether, if fol-
lowed, those rules will provide the fiscal backing necessary for monetary policy to control
inflation. Existing rules focus exclusively on fiscal sustainability, with some limited scope for
countercyclical actions. By concentrating on how fiscal choices should react to real economic
developments, the rules do not explicitly build in the responses to changes in the price level
or other nominal variables that passive behavior requires.
Fiscal rules have become commonplace among both advanced and emerging economies.
Bova, Kinda, Muthoora, and Toscani (2015) reports on de jure fiscal arrangements for 89
countries. Members of the European Union, for example, agreed to a “fiscal compact” in
2012 that calls on signatories to adopt fiscal rules that deliver general government budgets
that are balanced or in surplus [European Central Bank (2012, p. 101)]. Country-specific
medium-term fiscal objectives must be consistent with the balanced budget rule, though
5Loyo (1999) uses this combination of active monetary and active fiscal policies to explain Brazilian
inflation in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
6In his empirical work with U.S. data, Bohn (1998) brings economic growth into the analysis and concludes
that U.S. data imply dynamic inefficiency—the growth rate exceeds the real interest rate on government
bonds—so that γ > 0 is sufficient to deliver a bounded debt-GDP ratio.
7McCallum (1984) may be the first to obtain this result in a general equilibrium setting.
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in “exceptional circumstances” a country may deviate from those objectives. Countries
must adopt “automatic correction mechanisms” to bring deficits and debt in line with the
medium-term objectives.
To provide further flavor for prevailing fiscal rule, we briefly describe key features of the
fiscal rules that Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom have adopted.
Adopted in 2009, the German debt brake restricts structural deficits to no more than
0.35 percent of GDP for the federal government and 0 percent for the La¨nder governments
[Mayer and Sta¨hler (2009), Deutsche Bundesbank (2011), and Federal Ministry of Finance
(2015)]. Deficits are permitted over the cycle symmetrically, but only automatic stabilizers
are allowed. Any divergence between actual and planned expenditure is booked to a control
account, which under certain conditions triggers immediate budget policy actions. The
rules seem to be having their desired effects. After peaking at about 81 percent of GDP
in 2010, debt has been steadily falling [Eurostat]. Its general government, which includes
federal, state and local, and social security funds, has recorded positive net lending since
2014. German government bond yields have been extremely low; even the 10-year yield was
negative for much of 2016.
Switzerland adopted similar debt control through a permanently balanced budget rule
that is applied each year [Bodmer (2006) and Danninger (2002)]. Since 2003, any deviations
of actual spending from the adjusted pre-determined spending ceiling, are accumulated in a
notional “compensation account” and are required to be corrected within three years. The
Swiss debt brake was fully implemented in 2006: debt immediately started to fall from a peak
of 51 percent of GDP in 2003 to under 35 percent of GDP since 2010. Since 2015, the Swiss
general government budget has been balanced. Over that same period, Swiss government
bond yields have been negative along nearly the entire yield curve, while consumer price
inflation has been significantly below the Swiss National Bank’s 2 percent target, averaging
0.26 percent from 2009 to 2016.
Sweden adopted a ceiling on non-interest expenditures of the central government in 1997
[Swedish Government (2011)]. This ceiling is coupled with a net lending—surplus inclusive of
interest expenses—target specified as a percentage of GDP. The surplus target was 1 percent
from 2000 to 2016; in June 2016 seven out of eight political parties in Sweden agreed to reduce
the target to 1/3 percent of GDP starting in 2019 [National Institute of Economic Research
(2016)]. Local governments must balance their budgets. Along with the new surplus target
is a debt anchor at 35 percent of GDP, which implies that deviations of debt from target are
treated symmetrically. Like Switzerland, Swedish government debt has fallen fairly steadily
since 2000, while inflation has been below target, and zero coupon nominal bond yields have
been negative.
Since 2010, the United Kingdom has also been aiming to satisfy a balanced budget rule
that would achieve cyclically-adjusted current balance by the end of the third year of the
rolling, five-year forecast period, and a debt rule targeting a falling public sector net debt-to-
GDP ratio, supplemented by a predetermined welfare ceiling [HM Treasury (2014)]. So far,
the U.K. has not achieved these goals: figures from the Office for Budget Responsibility show
that by Maastricht treaty definitions, debt rose to 87.6 percent of GDP, though the deficit
fell to 4 percent of GDP in fiscal year 2015–2016. In contrast to Sweden and Switzerland,





The overarching objectives of all these adopted rules is debt reduction with eventual debt
stabilization. The rules seem clearly designed to solve political economy problems that lead
to chronic fiscal deficits and elevated levels of government debt. Aside from some provisions
for automatic stabilizers, the rules are not state contingent in the manner that passive
behavior prescribes. Support for monetary policy is implicit, but appears only in the form
of stabilizing debt at a low level to remove any pressure on the central bank to help with
fiscal financing.
The discussion in the last section and the evidence presented is, at best, merely suggestive
that adopted fiscal rules do not passively support monetary policy. While it is possible, as
Mayer and Sta¨hler (2009) do, to characterize debt-brake rules as passive, it is not at all clear
whether, in practice, fiscal authorities actually behave passively. The rhetoric of governments
is nearly lexicographic in debt reduction and stabilization.
Two types of future research may shed light on whether it is feasible for central banks
to achieve their inflation targets under current fiscal rules. First, theory needs to deliver
empirically verifiable predictions of how an economy behaves if inflation targeting is coupled
with fiscal behavior that does not consistently provide appropriate fiscal backing. Simple
theory, like that above, makes dire predictions of explosive inflation or deflation, which we
do not observe. Second, detailed analysis of actual fiscal actions and their rationale may
help us to identify the rules that fiscal authorities actually follow. No fiscal authority obeys
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